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BOOK REVIEW
THE CASE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION: REBUTTING
CONSERVATIVE COMPLAINTS OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN
"THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE RIGHT IS WRONG
ABOUT THE COURTS"
Reviewed by Sean Moynihan*
INTRODUCTION
In late June 2003, the United States Supreme Court handed down a
landmark decision that had been eagerly anticipated in many different
comers throughout the American populace. In Lawrence v. Texas,' a
five-member majority held that a Texas law criminalizing homosexual
sodomy was an unconstitutional infringement on an individual's liberty
interest in privacy as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 2 In overturning the Court's previous holding in Bow-
ers v. Hardwick,3 which had denied gay individuals a constitutional right
to engage in intimate sexual conduct, the majority adamantly declared
that the homosexual petitioners in the case, like heterosexuals in general,
were "entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean
their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause
gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention
of the government.",
4
Justice Scalia, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Thomas, was stinging in his rebuke of the majority's invocation of
the "right to liberty under the Due Process Clause" as a basis for over-
turning the Texas law. 5 "[T]here is no right to 'liberty' under the Due
Process Clause," he wrote.6 Furthermore, the majority's contention that
there was no rational basis for upholding the Texas law was "so out of
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Denver College of Law. The author would like to
thank Barry Brooks and Tom Devine for their support during the preparation of this Book Review
and Professor Martin Katz for his helpful insights into constitutional law issues.
1. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
2. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. Justice O'Connor concurred in the result but reasoned that
the Texas law should be ruled unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
3. 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
4. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
5. Id. at 2488-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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accord with our jurisprudence-indeed, with the jurisprudence of any
society we know-that it requires little discussion."7 Perhaps his most
ardent argument in opposition to the majority, though, was one based on
the impropriety of the Court's willingness to impose itself into the dis-
pute in the first place:
I have nothing against homosexuals, or any other group, promoting
their agenda through normal democratic means. Social perceptions of
sexual and other morality change over time, and every group has the
right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such matters is the
best .... But persuading one's fellow citizens is one thing, and im-
posing one's views in absence of democratic majority will is some-
thing else. ... What Texas has chosen to do is well within the range
of traditional democratic action, and its hand should not be stayed
through the invention of a brand-new "constitutional right" by a
Court that is impatient of democratic change. It is indeed true that
"later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and
proper in fact serve only to oppress," and when that happens, later
generations can repeal those laws. But it is the premise of our system
that those judgments are to be made by the people, and not imposed
by a governing caste that knows best.
8
Percolating just under the surface of Justice Scalia's words is the
longstanding and fundamental question of the proper role of the judiciary
in the American polity. What is the true, legal scope of judicial power in
our nation's tripartite system of government? What authority exists to tell
us how to define the limits of such a power? Moreover, has the judicial
branch already exceeded these limits whatever they may be? These en-
during questions have vexed legal scholars and interested observers alike
ever since Chief Justice John Marshall bluntly declared in Marbury v.
Madison9 that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."' 0 At issue in this great debate over
the role of the judiciary in a republican form of government is the extent
to which judges, particularly those in the federal judiciary who are
granted life tenure during good behavior," should be allowed to super-
impose their own belief systems and their own policy goals into their
adjudicative function.
Understandably, these questions have become hot-button issues in
political discourse as the nation has moved into the twenty-first century,
and library shelves have correspondingly become loaded with books,
7. Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10. Marbury, 5 U.S. ( Cranch) at 177.
11. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-




treatises, and articles opining on the matter. In one of the more recent of
these works, The Myth of the Imperial Judiciary: Why the Right Is
Wrong about the Courts,12 Mark Kozlowski examines the history and
validity of a conservative-based movement over the past forty years to
decry the so-called judicial activism of a judiciary that conservative
voices have accused of being overly pious to the liberal cause., 3 As his
title suggests, Kozlowski clearly takes the side of those who believe that
this charge against the judicial branch is misguided.' 4 Presenting a com-
pelling case against the conservative contention that judges need only
look to the "original intent" of the founders to interpret the law and that
an out-of-control judiciary has largely served liberal policies over the
past four decades, Kozlowski posits that the judicial branch was never
meant to be a marginal or insignificant branch, has not, in fact, always
sided with presumptively liberal policies, and is at all times safely con-
strained by democratic forces.' 5 In the end, though, one is left with a
feeling that, despite the author's rigorous scholarship supporting his view
of the true nature of judicial power in the United States, the rebuttal ar-
gument he presents in The Myth of the Imperial Judiciary is exactly
that-a rebuttal argument in opposition to another argument that may be
just as valid, legitimate, and supported by historical fact.
This Review is an exploration of these opposing theses concerning
the role of the judiciary in American life. Part I examines the sources of
conservative unrest over the judicial branch's alleged abuse of its
constitutionally granted powers and considers how some of these
conservative voices have expressed their umbrage over what they view
as court activism run amok. Part II analyzes the central arguments that
Kozlowski uses to rebut these conservative complaints issuing forth
against the courts and summarizes his own viewpoint regarding the
proper role of the judiciary. Part III assesses the two opposing views of
the judiciary and attempts to show that Kozlowski's position is
ultimately the most practicable one in light of the continuing need for
constitutional interpretation in an absence of detailed constitutional
directive from the Founding Fathers. Finally, Part IV concludes by
reaffirming the strength of Kozlowski's opinion, while at the same time
noting the inherent ambiguities involved in an age-old and ongoing
struggle to define the place of the judiciary in American government.
1 2. MARK KOZLOWSKI, THE MYTH OF THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE RIGHT IS WRONG
ABOUT THE COURTS (2003).
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I. THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY THEORISTS: ATTEMPTING TO REIN IN THE
JUDICIARY
A. Origins of Conservative Court Bashing
In terms of when, exactly, the recent scourge of conservative court-
bashing all began, Kozlowki points to an era when "'something was sup-
posed to happen, and didn't.-' 'I 6 From 1953 until 1969, the Supreme
Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren effected what is generally re-
garded as a revolution in American jurisprudence. 7 Beginning with its
unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education,'8 the Warren Court
embarked on a course of liberal and equalitarian rulings that encom-
passed "the elimination of officially sanctioned racial discrimination," ' 9
"the expansion of criminal procedure guarantees to the state and local
levels, '20 and the implementation of reapportionment plans devoted to
the ideal of "one man, one vote ...,,2
In response to this sustained burst of judicial overriding of long-
standing precedent, many conservative and, contrary to popular belief,
some liberal critics arose to question the Court's methodology of arriving
at such novel decisions.22 When President Richard M. Nixon was elected
to the presidency in November, 1968-largely on an anti-Warren Court
platform23-and Warren Burger was confirmed as Chief Justice, conser-
vatives were hopeful that, at last, a restrained Court would pursue "a
comprehensive rollback of Warren Court precedents in as many areas as
possible ....,,24 This hope, however, was ultimately dashed because, as
mentioned above, "something was supposed to happen, but didn't.
25
"What did not happen, of course," says Kozlowski, "is that the Burger
Court did not answer the fondest hopes of conservatives by overruling
Warren Court precedents, one after another.,
26
Indeed, the Burger Court did more than just continue the tradition of
pro-civil rights, Warren Court decision making. It also went even fur-
ther into the territory of judicial review of majoritarian legislation by
16. Id. at 17 (quoting Nathan Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, PUB. INT., Fall 1975,
at 106).
17. Id. at 13-14.
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also STEPHEN P. POWERS & STANLEY ROTHMAN, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH?: CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 38 (2002) (noting that Brown "is
widely regarded as the point of origin for the judicial activism of the Warren Court").
19. FREDERICK P. LEWIS, THE CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE ENDURANCE OF THE
WARREN COURT LEGACY IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE 25 (1999).
20. Id. at 26.
21. Id. at 27.
22. KOZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 14-16.
23. See id. at 14 (observing that President Nixon "made opposition to the Warren Court a
centerpiece of his successful 1968 presidential campaign").
24. Id. at 18.
25. See id. at 17.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 18.
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recognizing two new important areas of rights guaranteed under the Con-
stitution: gender equality and certain liberties under the Due Process
Clauses that pertain to privacy, personhood, and family relations.28 Of
course, perhaps the most influential and controversial of these decisions
was Roe v. Wade,29 where the Court held that the right of privacy guaran-
teed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in-
cluded a woman's fundamental right to choose to have an abortion sub-
ject to certain constraints. In the wake of decisions like Roe that further
cemented the Court's so-called "liberal" and "activist" leanings, formerly
tempered criticisms of the Court's wisdom eventually burgeoned into
full-scale attacks on its perceived descent into "judicial power mad-
ness."
31
B. The Imperial Judiciary Thesis
At the forefront of these attacks were commentators advocating
what Kozlowski terms "the Imperial Judiciary thesis. '32 These individu-
als, usually tending to the conservative end of the ideological spectrum,
have come to view the American judiciary as a wayward institution that
has "strayed so far from its intended powers and functions that it has
become unmoored from the values of a democratic order., 33 Perhaps the
most celebrated of these critics, and certainly one of the most articulate,
is Robert Bork, the failed Reagan nominee for the Supreme Court and a
prominent antagonist throughout Kozlowski's book. Bork is presented
as one of the more passionate proponents of what has been called the
"originalist" view of interpreting the Constitution.35 Under this view, the
Supreme Court should only find a right to exist when it is expressly pro-
vided for in the text of the Constitution or when it can be shown that the
framers clearly intended for it to exist.36 As Bork himself says in The
Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law,37 "lawyers and
28. Id.
29. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54, 164-65.
31. KOZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 16.
32. See id. at 5-6 (describing the essence of the Imperial Judiciary argument as the belief that
the judiciary has "become 'imperial'-that is, monarchical-and [has] also become imperialist in the
sense that its self-aggrandizing tendencies have resulted in its usurped powers and functions that are
properly exercised by other political institutions, especially legislatures peopled with elected repre-
sentatives").
33. Id. at 5.
34. See, e.g., id. at 33 (describing how Bork has "attained martyr status on the right because
of the defeat of his 1987 nomination to the Supreme Court" and how his book, ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990), has surpassed all
others "[iun terms of impact upon conservatives generally").
35. See id. at 34-38, 48-49.
36. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 1.4, at 17 (2d
ed. 2002).
37. BORK, supra note 34.
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judges should seek in the Constitution what they seek in other legal texts:
the original meaning of the words."
38
In Bork's o oinion, the originalist view, or as he terms it, "original
understanding," 3 is the sole legitimate method of constitutional interpre-
tation. 40 Indeed, it is a method whose consistent application is absolutely
necessary for the very survival and preservation of our fundamental civil
rights and our tripartite system of government. 41 As Bork says in the
closing passages of his chapter entitled The Original Understanding,
"The interpretation of the Constitution according to the original under-
standing, then, is the only method that can preserve the Constitution, the
separation of powers, and the liberties of the people. 42
In a broader sense, though, the Imperial Judiciary thesis does not
merely concern itself with weighing the validity of particular methods of
constitutional interpretation.43 It also depends in large part upon a view
that the American judiciary is knowingly taking affirmative steps to
promote a social policy agenda that it actively subscribes to.44 As
Kozlowski puts it, under the Imperial Judiciary view, "the judiciary is
said to be engaged in the imposition by fiat of a comprehensive vision of
a social order that judges prefer. '4 5 In addition to Brown v. Board of
Education46 and other seminal Warren Court decisions that appeared to
favor "liberal" causes,4 7 a cursory glance at Supreme Court cases over
the past three decades gives the reader an idea of what sort of decisions
may have fueled this belief in a grand policy-making judiciary that has
allegedly chosen to rule in favor of liberal policies "without any warrant
in law." 48
As mentioned above, the Court in Roe v. Wade49 affirmed a funda-
mental right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy; 50 in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,51 and again more recently in Grutter v.
Bollinger,5 z the Court upheld the right of public universities to use race
38. Id. at 145.
39. Id. at 143.
40. See id. (asserting that "only the approach of original understanding meets the criteria that
any theory of constitutional adjudication must meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy").
41. Id. at 159-60.
42. Id. at 159.
43. See KOZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 5.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
48. See KOZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 30 (discussing how Bork, in particular, believes that
the American courts are a regime, making cultural and moral decisions for the public outside the
jurisdiction of the law).
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
50. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54, 164-65.
51. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
52. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
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as a factor in admissions; 53 in Romer v. Evans,54 the Court invalidated an
amendment to the Colorado State Constitution that prohibited the state or
local municipalities from enacting statues or ordinances protecting gay
individuals from discrimination; 55 finally, in the previously mentioned
Lawrence v. Texas,56 the Court furthered this protection of homosexuals
when it ruled unconstitutional a Texas law that criminalized homosexual
sodomy.
57
C. The Outlaw Liberal Judiciary
To the adherent of the Imperial Judiciary theory, decisions like
these represent the worst of what Lino Graglia, another celebrated con-
servative critic of the judiciary, calls "government by and for an educa-
tional and cultural elite., 58 Here, Graglia is echoing a common refrain
among conservative detractors of the judicial branch:59 in overstepping
its constitutionally-imposed bounds, the judicial branch is significantly
influenced by a profound liberal strain found within the academic com-
munity, particularly the community existing in American law schools.
60
As noted conservative news columnist George F. Will has written:
Alexander Hamilton considered [the judiciary] the "least danger-
ous" branch because it supposedly is the least responsive to opinion.
But it has become the most dangerous, in part because it is the most
susceptible to gusts of opinion.
But the judiciary is even more blown about by opinion that is more
volatile, and often less sober, than the opinion of the public-that of
the intelligentsia. Change the academic culture of six law schools-
Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Michigan, Chicago, Stanford-and the in-
tellectual content of the judiciary will follow, quickly.
6 1
This view of an elite ruling class of liberal judges acting in contra-
vention of the Constitution was etched out in great detail, much to the
62
approval of the conservative faithful, in Raoul Berger's Government by
53. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
54. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
55. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635-36.
56. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
57. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
58. Lino A. Graglia, The Legacy of Justice Brennan: Constitutionalization of the Left-Liberal
PoliticalAgenda, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 183, 189 (1999); see also KOZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 26.
59. See KOZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 27 (noting that statements attributing the outcome of
certain Supreme Court decisions to a strong liberal influence from academics and scholars "are
legion among conservative commentators").
60. See id.
61. George F. Will, Myth of the Solomnonic Senate, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1998, at C7; see
also KOZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 7.
62. See KOZLOWSKI. supra note 12, at 31 (stating that Berger's book became "a central text of
the originalist movement" elevating Berger to the status of an intellectual American hero).
2003]
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Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 Berger's
central thesis was that, in the latter half of the twentieth century, the
United States Supreme Court had overstepped its authority under the
Constitution and had effectively rewritten the Constitution through its
controversial Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 64 According to
Kozlowski, Berger attempted to support this thesis by separating his
analysis into two essential parts: first, "an attack on the legitimacy of all
modern Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence; '65 and second, an attempt
to show that the true intent of the framers was to define the scope of ju-
dicial review in a much narrower way than the modern judiciary had
actually undertaken it.
66
Regarding the former, Kozlowski states that much of Berger's criti-
cism surrounds the concept of "incorporation," the process by which the
protections afforded to an individual in the Bill of Rights are made appli-
cable to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.67 According to Kozlowski, "Berger's argument is that incorpora-
tion is all a mistake or, more properly, a delusion. 68 Instead of subscrib-
ing to the Court's view that these fundamental rights are, indeed, prop-
erly applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Berger's
position, explains Kozlowski, is that:
[T]he framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had no intention what-
ever of nationalizing the Bill of Rights, or any part of it. On the con-
trary, the Fourteenth Amendment's framers had only the most modest
goals in mind. In spite of the sweeping phrases they used-"equal
protection," "due process," "privileges and immunities"-Berger ar-
gues that their intention was no greater than to constitutionalize the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which guaranteed the
rights of freed slaves to own property and make contracts. What it
did not guarantee was an end to racial segregation generally, which
leads Berger to the conclusion that, upon an originalist reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Brown v. Board of Education, the founda-
tion of modern civil rights law, was wrongly decided. 69
Thus, as Berger himself states in Government by Judiciary, if one
looks to the historical record, "the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
excluded both suffrage and segregation from its reach: they confined it to
protection of carefully enumerated rights against State discrimination,
deliberately withholding federal power to supply those rights where they
63. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997).
64. Id. at 18.
65. KOZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 3 1.
66. Id. at 32.
67. See id. at 3 1.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 31-32.
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were not granted by the State to anybody, white or black., 70 Through its
illegitimate interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, he concludes,
"The Court, it is safe to say, has flouted the will of the framers and sub-
stituted an interpretation in flat contradiction of the original design: to
",7
leave suffrage, segregation, and other matters to State governance.
Berger's second argument pertaining to the scope of judicial review
is, in Kozlowski's opinion, even more important to the discussion in The
Myth of the Imperial Judiciary.72 According to this argument, the true
intent of the framers was to narrowly confine judicial review to a binary
function of policing the limits of each governmental branch's constitu-
tional power and serving as "a vehicle by which the specific intentions of
the framers would be applied to legislative acts."73 By reducing the scope
of the judiciary's power of review in this manner, Berger argued, "the
framers 'drew a line between the judicial reviewing function, that is,
policing grants of power to insure that there were no encroachments be-
yond the grants, and legislative policymaking within those bounds.'
74
Of course, in this vision of judicial review where outright
policymaking is forbidden, the original intent of the framers is
paramount, and "any departure from their intent is nothing but an
exercise of arbitrary judicial discretion. 75 This has produced, says
Kozlowski, "a central tenet of the Imperial Judiciary thesis:, 76 that
"virtually all modern civil rights and civil liberties jurisprudence [has
been] an exercise of arbitrary judicial discretion. 77 It is this view of the
modern American judiciary-that of an arrogant power that has
disregarded the limitations on its constitutionally-granted authority and
has imposed its own legislative will on the populace-that Kozlowski
attempts to debunk in The Myth of the Imperial Judiciary.
II. COUNTERING THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY THESIS: HISTORICAL
UNDERPINNINGS FOR A STRONG AND INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY
A. Historical Support for an Independent Judiciary
In presenting his case against those who would condemn the prac-
tices of the modern American judiciary, Kozlowski makes it clear from
the beginning that he doesn't wish to become merely another partisan
fountain of liberal views and policies:
70. BERGER, supra note 63, at 457.
71. Id. at 458.
72. KoZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 32.
73. Id.





DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
I will generally avoid stating my opinions regarding the correctness
of particular judicial decisions .... I do not intend to advocate that
American courts pursue any particular jurisprudential course. Most
especially, even as I attack the Imperial Judiciary thesis, I am not en-
gaged in an effort to rouse liberal support for the defense of an inde-
pendent judiciary by proving that the courts have been "good" for
liberals.
78
What Kozlowski does intend is to "attempt to make a realistic appraisal
of the power of the American judiciary as a means of showing that con-
servatives have a highly unrealistic conception of this power."79 To do
this, he tells the reader, he must first embark, as the Imperial Judiciary
theorists had before him, on "an investigation into original intent" and
the nation's founding history.8°
Contrary to what the Imperial Judiciary theorists have contended,
Kozlowski says, the American judiciary, although famously declared
"the least dangerous" branch by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist
No. 78,8 was never meant to be constrained to the point of becoming
insignificant or marginalized within the polity.82 Indeed, as Kozlowski
points out in his introduction, Alexis de Tocqueville, the French aristo-
crat who traveled to the United States in 1831 and recorded his observa-
tions of American life and politics in his classic two-volume Democracy
in America, noted in his musings that "'[t]here is hardly a political ques-
tion in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judi-
cial one.' ' '83 Tocqueville even went as far as declaring that judges in
Jacksonian America were "'invested with immense political power.'
84
This important role of the courts as a check on power in the Ameri-
can system of government was assured by the framers at the inception of
the Constitution in large part because of a fear of oppressive tyranny in
the form of overwhelming political majorities. 85 As James Madison
warned in The Federalist No. 10:
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed
Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its ten-
dency to break and control the violence of faction .... Complaints
are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citi-
zens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and
78. Id. at 10.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 5 I.
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987); see also
KOZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 8 ("The phrase 'least dangerous branch' has now achieved a talis-
manic power among right-wing critics of the judiciary.").
82. See KOZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 9.
83. Id. at 8 (quoting I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (George
Lawrence trans., J.P. Mayer ed., Anchor Books ed., 1969)).
84. Id. (quoting DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 83, at 100).
85. See id. at 57-6 1.
200 [Vol. 8 1:1
BOOK REVIEW
personal liberty ... that measures are too often decided, not accord-
ing to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party, but by the
superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.
... When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular
government... enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest,
both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the
public good, and private rights, against the danger of such a faction,
and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular
government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are di-
rected.
86
Madison and his fellow founding representatives, then, acknowl-
edged the great need for an independent judiciary that could act as an
"excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the represen-
tative body. ''87 Moreover, an independent judiciary was, of course,
viewed as the governmental entity that was uniquely skilled and posi-
tioned to assess the validity of laws passed by the popular branches.88 As
Alexander Hamilton bluntly observed in The Federalist No. 22, "Laws
are a dead letter, without courts to expound and define their true meaning
and operation. ' '89
This authority to review legislative acts of the representative
branches, Kozlowski asserts, was also closely tied to the aforementioned
desire on the part of the engineers of the new republic to protect disen-
franchised minorities from majority oppression. 90 As he states in his sub-
chapter entitled Interpreting Statutes, "It was hoped that the practice of
elucidating the meaning of laws through statutory interpretation would
be undertaken with an eye toward the protection of minorities from the
unjust acts of legislative majorities.' ' 91 Moreover, to some of the leading
framers of the Constitution, the fact that judicial review per se was not
expressly provided for in the national charter was not a problem.
92
In Chapter Two of The Myth of the Imperial Judiciary, entitled The
Constitution and the Judiciary, Kozlowski presents Alexander Hamilton,
eventual Chief Justice John Marshall, and Patrick Henry, among others,
elaborating at the height of their oratorical powers on the great need for
an independent judiciary that could declare void laws that were in oppo-
86. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 41, 44 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987) (footnote
omitted).
87. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 8 I, at 396.
88. See id. at 398 ("The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts.").
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 108 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
90. See KoZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 76 ("IT]he supporters of the Constitution very much
wanted judges to engage in statutory interpretation guided by considerations of equity.").
91. Id.
92. See id. at 65-67.
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sition to the Constitution.93 Kozlowski's presentation of Marshall's plea
to the Virginia ratification convention is perhaps the most pointed:
If [the legislature] were to make a law not warranted by any of the
powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an in-
fringement of the Constitution which they are to guard. They would
not consider such a law as coming within their jurisdiction. They
would declare it void....
To what quarter will you look for protection from an infringement
on the Constitution, if you will not give the power to the judiciary?
There is no other body that can afford such a protection.
94
B. The Flaws of the Imperial Judiciary Theory
Kozlowski's point, it seems, is that from the earliest point in the na-
tion's history under the Constitution, "a substantive judicial power was a
central element of the federalist constitutional program., 95 Furthermore,
he contends, the "originalist" views of Berger, Bork, et al., mentioned
supra,96 do not have as much historical support as they have suggested
because the framers were, in fact, well aware of the Constitution's inher-
ent breadth and ambiguity of language.97 As James Madison said in The
Federalist No. 37, "no language is so copious as to supply words and
phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many,
equivocally denoting different ideas., 98
Noted constitutional scholar and lawyer Laurence Tribe reiterated
Madison's point in God Save This Honorable Court,99 an exploration
into the effect that the process of choosing United States Supreme Court
Justices has on the American population at large.1°° "The central flaw of
strict constructionism,"'' ° begins Tribe, "is that words are inherently
indeterminate-they can often be given more than one plausible mean-
ing." 0 2 "But the meanings of the Constitution's words are especially
difficult to pin down," he continues.10 3 For instance, he asks, "what, in
heaven's name, is 'due process'?"'°4 After conceding that the Court can
by no means "take the position of Humpty Dumpty, that 'a word means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less,"' 0 5 Tribe con-
93. See id.
94. Id. at 66 (quoting I THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 553, 554 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836)).
95. Id. at 85.
96. See supra notes 33-41, 61-71, and accompanying text.
97. See KOZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 68-75.
98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 180 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
99. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985).
100. See id. at ix.
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cludes by stating flatly that "the constitutional text is not enough-we
need to search for, and explain our selection of, the principles behind the
words."'°6
C. Other Eras of Judicial Activism
These arguments are certainly not insignificant and lend consider-
able credence to Kozlowski's view that a dynamic judicial branch with
the authority to interpret the broadly textured language of the Constitu-
tion was in the minds of the framers when they first convened to form the
republic. For all of the persuasiveness of Kozlowski's attempt to show
that a strong independent judiciary was intended at the nation's founding,
perhaps more compelling is his subsequent survey of three distinct peri-
ods in American history when, he asserts, the judicial branch exhibited
"activist cycles" well before the era of the Warren Court.10 7 Beginning
with (1) the activist role of the courts in designing a national economic
order in the first half of the nineteenth century; turning next to (2) essen-
tially a judicial nullification of the Civil War Amendments in the first
few decades following the Civil War; and finally concluding with (3) the
judiciary's active role in opposing labor unions in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, Kozlowski presents a substantial case refuting
the view that court activism first "sprang fully grown from the forehead
of Chief Justice Warren."1
0 8
Regarding the economic activism of the early nineteenth century,
Kozlowski shows that, in the areas of property, torts, contract, and corpo-
rate law, the courts came to assume a central active role in facilitating
market growth and entrepreneurial spirit and energy.'
°9 The court deci-
sions exemplifying this role of the judiciary as a catalyst for economic
growth encompassed, among other innovations, the creation of greater
operating areas for railroad companies that necessarily allowed for
greater intrusion into communities," 10 the placement of costs of industrial
accidents on injured workers to encourage more entrepreneurial opportu-
nities for businesses,"' and the favoring of free competition "over the
protection of [individual] corporate rights that threatened to slow devel-
opment."' 2 The general theme thriving throughout all of these varied
judicial opinions, though, was an abiding fidelity to the view that "'[t]he
onward spirit of the age must, to a reasonable extent, 
have its way." ' 13
As Kozlowski puts it: "Contrary to nostalgic cant, America did not de-
106. Id.
107. See KozLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 87.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 88-98.
110. Id. at 90-91.
IIl. Id. at 93-94.
112. Id. at 95-96.
113. Id. at 91 (quoting Lexington & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. 289, 309 (1839)).
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velop a market [economy] that grew of itself, governed by minimal legal
intrusion.,,"' 14
In his discussion of the post-Civil War era, Kozlowski states that,
following the enactment of the Civil Rights Amendments after the war,
American courts, especially the Supreme Court, displayed this activist
bent to a very harmful degree by effectively nullifying the meaning of
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and inflicting a
half century of segregationist Jim Crow laws on the nation." 5 This was
done largely through the Court's imposition of very narrow constructions
of provisions within the amendments in cases such as the Slaughter-
House Cases,' 16 United States v. Cruikshank, 17 the Civil Rights Cases,"'
and Plessy v. Ferguson." 19 Critically, these decisions ignored what many
believe to be the true meaning behind the amendments, and, as
Kozlowski points out, "[a]s long as the federal judiciary forsook the
mandate of the Civil War Amendments and left local majorities free to
define rights as they wished, those amendments were of no practical
value."1
20
Finally, concluding his brief examination of these particular eras of
judicial activism, Kozlowski summarizes how, near the end of the nine-
teenth century and into the twentieth, the judicial branch acted affirma-
tively to counter the rise of the labor unions.12' At that point in the na-
tion's history, courts viewed the unions largely as a threat to peaceable
order, and the jurisprudence emanating from the time "was therefore less
marked by a rigid adherence to the tenets of laissez-faire and more by a
dogged effort to counter this perceived threat."' 22 In fact, the judicial
animus towards the unions was of such magnitude, says Kozlowski, that
it significantly exceeded what the modem-era courts have done in the
realm of so-called judicial activism:
What happened during this era was more than what Imperial Judi-
ciary theorists contend has happened today with respect to matters
like abortion. That is, the era saw more than a judicial arrogation of
power that took political questions out of the hands of the public and
imposed judicial solutions upon them. The anti-union era was marked
by a judicial attempt to actually suppress a political movement.123
114. Id. at 88-89.
115. See id. at 99, 109.
116. 83 U.S. 36 (16 Wall.) (1872).
117. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
118. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
119. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
120. KoZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 109.
121. See id. at 110-15.
122. Id. at 110.
123. Id. at 115.
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D. The True Nature of the Courts in the American System
Thus, Kozlowski says, Robert Bork's opinion that judicial activism
has never been more popular with law schools, the press, and "'elite
groups generally ' "1 24 than in the present day is "flatly incorrect.'
25
Courts in America had long before the Warren era "exercised a substan-
tial influence upon great social and political questions ....,,126 Moreover,
he explains, the Warren Court's most radical rights-expanding decisions
during the era were not victories solely for the left wing in American
politics. 2 7 As examples, Baker v. Carr'
28 in the area of redistricting, and
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan'29 in the area of political speech, were,
along with their respective progeny, landmark decisions that favored no
particular ideology. 30 In addition, says Kozlowski, much of the judicial
branch's authority and power has, in fact, been conferred by the elected
branches of government, and these branches, even apart from the already
constitutionally enumerated limits on the judiciary, can significantly con-
strain the powers of the courts.
1 31
The American judiciary, Kozlowski argues then, is not, as some
would claim, a lofty entity "standing apart and above the polity, descend-
ing on occasion ... to impose [its] purportedly superior legal and ethical
comprehension upon the wayward popular branches 
of government." 3
2
On the contrary, he opines, "[iut is in fact embedded in the political proc-
ess,"' 133 and as such, remains a vigorous institution that is eminently use-
ful and conducive to keeping the American system in functional opera-
tion. 134 And that, according to the author, is something worth defend-
ing.
135
III. ANALYSIS: ORIGINALISM vs. NONORIGINALISM: A FLAWED
IMPERIAL JUDICIARY THEORY AND THE UTILITY OF MORE FLEXIBLE
METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. The Weakness of Original Intent
The central issue presented in The Myth of the Imperial Judiciary-
how judges should go about interpreting the provisions of the nation's
supreme legal document-presents a confounding puzzle for those bat-
tling to control the legal and political landscape of the country. Who is
124. Id. at 114 (quoting BORK, supra note 34, at 7).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 87.
127. Id. at 125.
128. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
129. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
130. KozLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 128, 133.
131. See id. at 9, 178.
132. Id. at 178.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 217-18.
135. Id. at 217.
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correct ultimately? Robert Bork and advocates of the Imperial Judiciary
thesis, from their entrenched battlements of original understanding,
would, of course, hold that the framers alone are right and should be
given deference at all costs. But how should the views of the framers be
ascertained now, well over two centuries later, when the American popu-
lace finds itself living in an era that the framers could not have dreamed
about from their horse-drawn carriage, slave-ownership vantage point in
the late eighteenth century?
36
Bork answers this question by asserting that the original understand-
ing can be uncovered in "the words used and in secondary materials,
such as debates at the conventions, public discussion, newspaper articles,
dictionaries in use at the time, and the like."' 137 This answer is certainly
well and good when an explicit reference to the intent surrounding the
drafting of a constitutional provision can be found, but what about those
situations when no discernible manifestation of intent is present in any
extant writings? To reiterate Laurence Tribe's plea, "what, in heaven's
name, is 'due process' ?,,38 This question reveals the ultimate ascendancy
of Kozlowski's argument and exposes a central flaw in the Imperial Ju-
diciary thesis's position: not all cases and situations calling for constitu-
tional interpretation can be readily answered by reference to original
intent. Bork himself acknowledges this fact in The Tempting of America
when he states that, in some cases, "very little or nothing" is known
about the particular meaning behind certain constitutional provisions.139
This flaw, though, is not insurmountable in Bork's mind. The rem-
edy in such a situation is very simple. To use an analogy from the game
of football, the judge who cannot discern any original intent in a
constitutional provision should merely "punt"-i.e. turn the issue over to
the democratic process. As Bork says:
If the meaning of the Constitution is unknowable, if, so far as we
can tell, it is written in undecipherable hieroglyphics, the conclusion
is not that the judge may write his own Constitution. The conclusion
is that judges must stand aside and let current democratic majorities
rule, because there is no law superior to theirs.140
Thus, concludes Bork, "The judge who cannot make out the meaning of
a provision is in exactly the same circumstance as a judge who has no
136. See, e.g., MARK N. GOODMAN, THE NINTH AMENDMENT: HISTORY, INTERPRETATION,
AND MEANING 13 (1981) (stating that "[iut can be asserted with a great degree of certainty that the
Framers were unable to foresee the emergence of automobiles, airplanes, and sojourns to the moon."
and noting that many observers "believe that a constitution must be able to be adapted to changing
eras, unforeseen exigencies, and the development of new sociological conditions beyond the realm
of human comprehension two hundred years ago").
137. BORK, supra note 34, at 144.
138. TRIBE, supra note 99, at 42.
139. BORK, supra note 34, at 165.
140. Id. at 166-67.
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Constitution to work with. There being nothing to work with, the judge
should refrain from working."'
' 4'
The problem with this rather pat answer, of course, is that it leads to
the very danger that the framers so wished to avoid in forming their new
republic: domination under "the superior force of an interested and over-
bearing majority."' 142 The framers were keenly aware of the potentially
harmful effects that a dominant majority could have on the country and
on vulnerable minorities, and, contrary to popular myth, the majority that
they feared the most was the one that would be comprised of the com-
mon proletarian citizen. In Toward Increased Judicial Activism,'
4 3 Arthur
Selwyn Miller says: "The true unifying theme of the period was the
power of a burgeoning plutocracy versus that of the yeomanry-the
creditor class against the debtors."' 44 Alexander Hamilton and his fellow
drafters of the Constitution believed in the propriety of a ruling class of
educated, propertied aristocrats, and an independent judiciary made up of
these elite individuals was the precise vehicle that could counteract the
encroaching forces of the non-propertied "debtor class.',
145 As Miller
explains:
Drafters of the Constitution were men of property, zealously inter-
ested in protecting it and in the liberty to increase it. They did not be-
lieve in democracy (however defined). Indeed, John Adams waxed
choleric about the possibility of a "democratical despotism." He was
not alone: the Framers wanted government by "the wise, the good
and the rich," *which they tended to lump together as one aristocratic
group. The Document thus was a counter-revolution to the ideas of
the Declaration of Independence, particularly those dealing with
equality, which was aimed at controlling excessive governmental
power. As written, the Document seemed to establish a government
too weak to protect the rich, the moneyed, and the propertied....
Something more was needed if the "wise, the good, and the rich"
were to receive the protection they believed was necessary. Produc-
ing that "something" became a major function of the Supreme
Court. 1
4 6
These are strong words, to be sure, but as Kozlowski points out in
The Myth of the Imperial Judiciary, none other than James Madison en-
dorses them in both The Federalist and in other writings.147 "[T]he most
common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal
141. Id. at 166.
142. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 86, at 41.
143. ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE POLITICAL
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1982).
144. Id. at 55.
145. See id.
146. Id. (footnotes omitted).
147. See KOZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 58-60.
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distribution of property," Madison states in The Federalist No. 10.148
"Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed
distinct interests in society."'' 49 Kozlowski thus frames the dilemma:
"[W]hat sort of institutional mechanisms would preserve republican gov-
ernment while at the same time providing the best hope of alleviating the
increasing capacity of popular majorities to invade the rights of the prop-
ertied minority?"'' 50 One of the primary answers to this question, of
course, is what Kozlowski argues for throughout his book: a strong and
independent judiciary.
B. The Ninth Amendment Factor
Kozlowski is astute also in revealing another weakness in the con-
servative wing's condemnation of the so-called activist judiciary: the
Ninth Amendment.'15 This amendment states that "[tihe enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people."'' 52 Although legal scholars and
commentators have argued for the recognition of unenumerated rights
under the Ninth Amendment, 5 3 courts have generally been reluctant to
do so154 and a significant number of claims asserting rights under the
provision have been denied.
55
The fact remains, though, that the Ninth Amendment remains in
place and in effect in the Constitution. Furthermore, the United States
Supreme Court has not completely ignored the amendment's force and
applicability in the course of the Court's jurisprudence. 156 The key point
here is that, by the Ninth Amendment's very wording, the framers felt
that it was necessary to include in the nation's charter a provision that
protected rights that were not specifically listed therein. 57 As Kozlowski
notes in his discussion of the Ninth Amendment, "[t]he Constitution thus
explicitly recognizes the existence of rights other than those set forth in
148. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 86, at 43.
149. Id.
150. KOZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 59.
151. See id. at 40-41, 79-80.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
153. J.D. Droddy, Originalist Justification and the Methodology of Unenunerated Rights, 1999
DETROIT COLL. L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 809, 812.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 813-14 (listing various claims of rights under the Ninth Amendment that have been
rejected by courts).
156. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding that the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence "suggest[s] that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras.
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guaran-
tees create zones of privacy"(citations omitted)); see also Droddy, supra note 153, at 815-17 (noting
several other cases in which the Ninth Amendment was either expressly invoked or implicitly re-
ferred to).
157. See Droddy, supra note 153, at 829 ("It would seem that the plain meaning of the words
of the Ninth Amendment should put the question of the existence and reservation by the framers of
unenumerated rights beyond the scope of debate .... ).
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its text."'' 58 Logic and common sense would not seem to hold otherwise,
for to include the Ninth Amendment in the Constitution without intend-
ing to give it real meaning would essentially reduce it to, in Chief Justice
John Marshall's words, "mere surplusage, [that] is entirely without
meaning ..... 159 This wasteful result surely cannot be what the authors
of the Constitution intended. As Marshall said of methods of constitu-
tional interpretation that would effectively nullify constitutional provi-
sions, "[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is in-
tended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmis-
sible, unless the words require it."' 60
C. The Presence of Conservative Judicial Activism
Of course, the ultimate irony in all of this discussion of the so-called
liberal activism of the courts is that conservative courts have been just as
guilty as their alleged liberal counterparts in issuing certain "activist"
decisions.161 To see this, one need only look as far as the controversial
United States Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore'
62 that ultimately
determined the outcome of the 2000 presidential election.
1 63 To liberal
commentators, this decision was handed down by a five-member major-
ity of conservative justices who, "confident of their power, and brazen in
their authority, engaged in flagrant judicial misconduct that undermined
the foundations of constitutional government.' 164 To those who champi-
oned the decision, however, it was perhaps only a very difficult case that





Regardless of the political ramifications of the decision, however,
the lesson to be learned from the collision of such disparate viewpoints
of a particular court's actions is that these viewpoints are exactly that-
viewpoints that are dependant upon each individual's own peculiar po-
litical, legal, and moral compasses. In 1992, Judge William Wayne Jus-
tice of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
158. KOZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 40.
159. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
160. Marbur*, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 174.
161. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1092 (2001) (observing that the liberal activism of the Warren Court "has been
replaced with one much harsher and more conservative, protecting state governments from civil
rights plaintiffs, state officers from federal regulatory mandates, property owners from environ-
mental regulation, and whites from affirmative action"); William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the
Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1254-55 (2002) (concluding that "con-
servative judicial activism is pervasive, expansive, and transgresses nearly all activism norms"). See
generally Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong with Conservative
Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201 (2000) (critiquing the recent federalism-based judicial
activism of the Rehnquist Court).
162. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
163. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 161, at 1049.
164. Id. at 1049-50.
165. Marshall, supra note 161, at 1222.
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wrote: "Though it is infrequently a thing of beauty, jurisprudential activ-
ism is definitely in the eye of the beholder."' 66 By this, he appears to
mean that one person's perception of an illegitimate act of judicial poli-
cymaking could be another person's perception of a triumphant ruling in
favor of justice and human equality. Thus, from this perspective, the ap-
pearance or non-appearance of judicial activism is largely a product of
each individual's own personal predilections and value systems. Or, as
Professor Ernest A. Young recently put it: "[Plarticipants in both aca-
demic and political debates generally use 'judicial activism' as a conven-
ient shorthand for judicial decisions they do not like."'
167
Where Kozlowski's viewpoint surpasses that of the Imperial Judici-
ary theorists in terms of efficacy and productivity is in its inherent
adaptability to American society's ever changing sociological and tech-
nical evolution. Without the authority to interpret the nation's founding
document in relation to the particular era that the constitutional issue is
being litigated, the courts would be forced to surrender to those who, as
Arthur Selwyn Miller has described, "would have modern America re-
pair to the shades of men long dead and allow them-in theory-to rule
from their graves."'' 68 This grim prospect, it seems, would be a first in the
nation's history, for as Miller attests: "No nation, no society, has ever
been ruled that way, certainly not the United States."' 69 In view of a na-
tion's history that is full of stories of slavery, discrimination against
women and minorities, and a myriad of other shames, it is Kozlowski's
view that best allows an ever-changing society to cure its ills and provide
for protections against this lingering desire to remain stunted in the past,
to give effect to a "dictatorship over the living by the dead."'
' 70
CONCLUSION
In The Myth of the Imperial Judiciary, Mark Kozlowski has chosen
to confront an uncertain charge against the judiciary that it has over-
stepped its constitutional bounds in the name of liberal ideology, and in
the process of doing so, he has written a significant defense of the courts
in the American polity. Instead of merely dismissing the conservative
claim of judicial overreaching, he has chosen to meet the critics on their
own fields of battle-American history and American jurisprudence-
and has put up a considerable fight to defend what Alexander Hamilton
166. J. William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. I,
4(1992).
167. Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139,
1141 (2002).





once exaltedly called "the CITADEL of the public justice and the public
security."' 7 '
In the end, Kozlowski presents the most viable vision of constitu-
tional interpretation for an era that is drastically different from the time
in which the framers lived. Because the drafters of the Constitution did
not and could not leave succeeding generations with a comprehensive
instructional guide to their intentions behind the forging of the founding
charter, it has been left up to "the least dangerous" branch, 72 the judici-
ary, to apply its wisdom in adjudicating contemporary problems and dis-
putes that plague American life. Still, as evidenced by the decades-long
battle over the issue of judicial authority and by the wealth of scholarly
material springing from either side on the subject, the fact remains that
judicial activism and constitutional interpretation are matters that may
simply be too perplexing to ever allow for clearly ascertainable answers.
As Kozlowski himself points out, "the meaning of the Constitution's
terms has been contested right from the beginning of the operation of
government under that document." 1
73
Thus, this question of the proper role of the judicial branch in the
American experiment will most certainly endure throughout the life of
the republic. The tides of political opinion will ebb and flow, critics will
decry the arrogance of the judges, and-as Hamilton reminded his fellow
citizens so many years ago at the birth of their nation-the courts will
continue, despite it all, to be "the best expedient which can be devised in
any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration
of the laws."'
174
171. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 81, at 397.
172. Id. at 396.
173. KOZLOWSKI, supra note 12, at 75.
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